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Abstract
Accurately predicting the most realistic schedule for a defense acquisition
program is an extremely difficult challenge considering the inherent risk and
uncertainties present in the early stages of a program. To minimize the risk of
underestimating or overestimating a program’s schedule, the program manager requires a
transparent, unbiased method of schedule estimation. Through the application of multiple
regression modeling, we provide the program manager with a statistical model which
predicts schedule duration from Program Initiation (Milestone B) to the Initial
Operational Capability of the program’s deliverable system. Our model explains 42.9
percent of the variation in schedule duration across the historical data from a sample of
56 defense programs from all military services. Statistically significant predictor
variables include whether a program is a new effort or modification to an existing
program, the year of Milestone B start as it relates to changes in defense acquisition
reform policy, and the amount of raw funding (adjusted for inflation) prior to Milestone
B for a program. Our strongest predictor variable, percent of total RDT&E funding
occurring prior to Milestone B, indicates that increased funding for pre-Milestone B
technology risk reduction may shorten a program’s schedule duration to Initial
Operational Capability.
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Predicting Schedule Duration for Defense Acquisition Programs:
Program Initiation to Initial Operational Capability

I. Introduction
General Issue
As of the “Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management” policy
memorandum in June 2011, the Air Force employs a ‘will-cost’ analysis and ‘shouldcost’ analysis to all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, II, and III programs as a way to try
to realize cost savings through operational efficiencies found in the defense acquisitions
process (Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management, Appendix B).
However, in the Air Force, as well as the other Department of Defense (DoD) services,
no similar analysis for schedule duration has existed as a policy for trying to optimize the
timeliness of an acquisition.
On 15 September, 2015 at the annual Air Force Association conference that was
held in National Harbor, MD, Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Deborah Lee James
introduced the Air Force’s newest acquisition strategy, an initiative she called ‘shouldschedule’. “The should-schedule approach will work in a similar manner to an acquisition
management tool the service has been using called ‘should-cost’. Unlike should-cost, the
new should-schedule strategy will focus on delivery time. We asked ourselves, ‘Can we
develop a structure that challenges us and our industry partners to deliver [weapons
systems] faster than the schedule determined as part of the independent cost estimate? If
we can collectively beat the historical developmental schedules and reward behavior in
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government and industry that speeds things up, we have a real chance to make a
difference,” Secretary James emphasized (James, 2015).
Secretary James and the should-schedule initiative provide for a heightened focus
on schedule duration estimating in the cost analysis community. Many program cost
estimates are created under the assumption of a static schedule, which can create
extrapolated problems in the program if the estimated schedule of a program gets delayed
or derailed. Furthermore, research by the RAND Corporation found that increases in
schedule effort tend to be the reason for increases in the cost of acquiring a new weapons
system due to, at a minimum, increased inflation and overhead factors (Drezner and
Smith, 1990:1).
Accurately establishing the most realistic schedule for a program, especially at the
official initiation of a program, is an extremely difficult task considering the inherent risk
and uncertainties that are present in the early stages of a program. Programs that decide to
use an unnecessarily lengthy schedule as a program strategy run the risk of delaying the
level of technological advancement that may be critical to national safety.
However, accelerated program schedules increase the risks of unscheduled delays
and expensive rework and retooling costs, especially if a problem is found later in the
accelerated program schedule. A recurring theme of defense critics however is that most
programs err on the side of being too lengthy and that policy reforms should be
introduced to shorten the cycle (Drezner and Smith, 1990: iii). Secretary James’ shouldschedule initiative, along with the push for a greater focus on program scheduling
methodology, may be the kind of policy reform Drezner and Smith were alluding to 25
years ago.
2

Specific Issue
Past research on schedule is relatively limited at AFIT, mostly because students in
the Graduate Cost Analysis (GCA) program traditionally tend to focus their research
efforts on predicting and optimizing costs, rather than schedule. Current Air Force
practice is for cost estimators to either rely on subject matter expert (SME) opinion to
evaluate the schedule risk levels of different program factors, or perform an analogous
schedule estimate based on a comparable project that has been previously completed.
These methods of “best guess” are the current standard applied to arrive at the estimated
schedule of a program.
As it currently stands in the Air Force, there is no quantitatively-focused method
used for predicting schedule duration of a program that is driven by the data of past
weapons systems. This is the first research to be conducted at AFIT that is focused on
predicting a program’s actual schedule duration based on historical data and
mathematical modeling. Tangentially related, Monaco (2005) looks at identifying if a
program runs the risk of schedule delay, and then predicting the amount of schedule
delay for that specific program after it has experienced a schedule delay; his research
employed the use of a two-step mathematical modeling procedure.
Scope and Limitations of Research
The scope of this research is limited to predicting schedule duration in months for
defense acquisition programs from program initiation, which is the start of Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (EMD), to Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Official
program initiation happens when the EMD phase starts, which is at Milestone B. IOC is
the state achieved when a capability is available in its minimum usefully deployable
3

form. At IOC, capability may be fielded to a limited number of users with plans to extend
to all intended users incrementally over a period of time. Declaration of IOC may imply
that the capability will be further developed in the future, for example by modifications
or upgrades to improve the system's performance, deployment of greater numbers of
systems (perhaps of different types), or testing and training that permit wider application
of the capability (DAU, 2015).

Figure 1: Defense Acquisition Program Schedule with MS-B to IOC Depiction
In our research, we believe that more value could be extracted in seeking to
predict schedule duration from MS-B to IOC, instead of seeking to predict schedule
duration from MS-B to Production and Deployment (P&D) start which is at Milestone C
(MS-C). This is due to the fact that the start of the P&D phase is not always as clearly
defined as the start of the MS-B in the acquisition life cycle. Common practice is to have
both EMD and P&D run concurrent for some time in the acquisition life cycle, with the
intent of having a system being produced while it is simultaneously being developed
(Birchler et al., 2011). Because of this practice, decision makers have a less stringent
proxy to beginning the P&D phase compared to EMD phase. Thus, if EMD phase is still
going on while P&D phase begins, the concurrency between the two phases may present
a lack of clarity in the distinction of the two phases to be able to make a sound decision
under the program complexities at that point. Furthermore, commanders and decision
4

makers may be more concerned with the time to IOC of a weapons system, since it
directly relates to fielding a capability earliest in support of critical mission needs (DAU,
2015).
Since we seek to predict MS-B to IOC of a program, a limitation is that we look
to only include programs that have pre-MS-B data available. We limit our database
further to include only unclassified programs that completed the IOC phase of an
acquisition. For this data, we use the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), maintained by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which provides reported in-depth finance
and schedule data for selected programs (Brown et al., 2015). We also give extra focus on
Research Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, as it is the funding
deployed for both pre-MS-B and MS-B efforts. The detail and availability of the SARs
provide the appropriate information needed to build a proprietary database necessary for
this research.
Research Objectives
Our major objective is to have the mathematical model developed in this research
to be used as a tool in the cost analysis community. The mathematical model employed
for this research involves a multiple regression model that provides an output value in
months. For the purpose of this study, the output from the multiple regression analysis
encompasses overall time duration in months, starting at MS-B, through EMD, P&D,
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOT&E) phases, up to IOC.
The objective of the multiple regression model we create is to have it stand as a
predictive tool that outputs a schedule duration that decision makers can use as a realistic
5

schedule benchmark for their programs. A readily available application of said schedule
benchmark is for decision makers to try to employ operational efficiencies in a program
as to try to deliver a program’s capability quicker than what the data-driven benchmark
suggests. This creates the kind of structure that Secretary James mentioned; one which
can challenge the Air Force and industry partners to deliver [weapons systems] faster
than the schedule determined as part of the independent cost estimate (James, 2015).
Research Questions
Our research is focused on addressing two research questions. First, we seek to
answer the research question, “Can we accurately predict what the schedule duration of a
defense acquisition program should be, from MS-B to IOC, using a mathematical
model?” Independent of said mathematical model, we analyze explanatory variables from
program data in search of answering the question, “Can we show that some explanatory
variables are stronger than others when used for predicting a future program’s schedule
duration?”
Summary
Predicting the schedule duration from MS-B to IOC for programs can reduce
program risks and help ensure intended performance capabilities are realized within a
specific program’s cost and schedule thresholds. In our research, we identify reasons for
schedule variance along with potential predictors of schedule variance by conducting a
literature review in Chapter II. The literature review provides the necessary foundation
for our data collection and database creation in Chapter III. We then conduct preliminary
analysis of the data in order to create the multiple regression analysis model that seeks to
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predict a program’s schedule to from MS-B to IOC. In Chapter IV, we build, test, and
validate the multiple regression analysis, as well as provide a meaningful discussion of
the results. Finally, in Chapter V, we provide conclusions to our research, and possible
follow-on research.

7

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
Developing a major weapons system is risky and full of uncertainty.
Requirements, politics, economics, and the system’s technological design are just a few
of the uncertainties that create risk in this venture. This can materialize in the form of
variance between the planned schedule duration and the actual schedule duration of a
program. “Excessive schedules have two significant negative effects: U.S. forces may be
left without needed capabilities and longer schedules often mean higher costs” (Tyson et
al., 1994:S-1).
To begin addressing our research objectives and questions, we start by looking at
research that can give us greater insight into the intricate details associated with
predicting a program’s schedule duration to IOC. In this chapter, we provide an overview
of past research conducted on defense acquisition program schedules, particularly as it
relates to helping us identify significant characteristics necessary for our answering our
research questions and building of a multiple regression model. For structured continuity,
we only provide an overview of research findings on program schedules from within the
defense acquisition environment. Based on our literature review, we create a foundation
from which to start the methodology for predicting schedule duration to IOC, which we
describe in Chapter III.
Research Findings
The time required to create a new weapons system from program initiation to IOC
is an important element to understand in the acquisition process. Cost and schedule
overruns in major weapons systems are continuing problems that plague the acquisition
8

environment. The following research studies discuss various direct and indirect findings
associated with program schedule inaccuracies and overruns and investigates variables
that can help predict schedule duration.
Brown, White, Ritschel, and Seibel (2015)
Brown et. al (2015) investigates the minimal methodology in the literature that is
provided for estimating the S-curve’s parameter values. Brown, White, and Gallagher
(2002) resolve this shortcoming through regression analysis, but their methodology has
not been widely adopted by aircraft cost analysts, as it is judged as overly broad and not
specific to aircraft. Instead, analysts commonly apply the 60/40 “rule of thumb” to
aircraft development, assuming 60 percent expenditures at 50 percent schedule.
Using a sample of 26 DoD aircraft programs, Brown et al. (2015) first tests the
accuracy of 60/40, discovering that, as a heuristic, the 60/40 cannot account for
differences between new start and upgrade programs. Next, they improve upon prior
research by using program characteristics to construct an aircraft-specific methodology
for estimating parameters. Finally, they conclude the research by comparing the accuracy
of their Rayleigh, Weibull, and Beta S-curve models. The Weibull model explains 82
percent of total variation in expenditures, improving the estimation of annual
expenditures by nine percent, on average, over the baseline 60/40 model.
For Brown et al. (2015) in particular, three pieces are relevant to our research.
First is the acknowledgement of the 60/40 “rule of thumb” that is applied to aircraft
development, assuming 60 percent expenditures at 50 percent schedule. This tells us that
if such a concept is applied in the aircraft development community, then perhaps a
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similar concept surrounding the percentage of early expenditures in a program could be
applied to as a potential predictor of schedule.
Second, they acknowledge that while their methodology utilizes budget and
schedule data from the latest SAR available for each aircraft development program, they
also acknowledge that this does not account for any cost or schedule growth which exists
between the aircraft program’s first and latest SAR. The assumption of a static schedule
contrasts with the “real world”, where cost and schedule estimates are rarely clairvoyant
(Brown et al., 2015:60). This further emphasizes the need for our research on schedule
duration.
Finally, and most uniquely, Brown et al. (2015) finds a significant variable that is
centered on defense acquisition reform policy. They show that programs which began
development during 1985 or later (considered “contemporary”) expend a greater
percentage of obligations by their schedule midpoint than the earlier pre-1985 programs.
They hypothesize that this difference is due to the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense (commonly called the Packard Commission) and the subsequent acquisition
reforms.
Dietz, Eveleigh, Holzer, and Sarkani (2013)
This study focuses on the pre-MS-B process in a defense acquisition. The
researchers state that with 70 percent of a system’s life-cycle cost set at pre-MS-B, the
most significant cost savings potential is prior to MS-B. Pre-MS-B efforts are usually
reduced to meet tight program schedules. This article proposes a new Systems
Engineering Concept Tool and Method (SECTM) that uses genetic algorithms to quickly
identify optimal solutions. Both are applied to unmanned undersea vehicle design to
10

show process feasibility. The method increases the number of alternatives assessed,
considers technology maturity risk, and incorporates systems engineering cost into the
Analysis of Alternatives process. While not validated, the SECTM would enhance the
likelihood of success for sufficiently resourced programs (Deitz et al.,2013). In Table 1,
we analyze a cost estimating relationship (CER) table the researchers created relating the
technical maturity of a program as it crosses into MS-B, and a cost multiplier associated
with said maturity.
Table 1: Cost Factors Associated with Technological Maturity

We look to this study as rudimentary justification to collect pre-MS-B data for the
purpose of predicting schedule, as the researchers were able to derive predictive factors
for programs using data based on technological maturity in the pre-MS-B phase.
Birchler, Christle, and Groo (2011)
Birchler et al. (2011) acknowledges the idea that developing a weapons system
while in production does increase program risk and is sometimes cited as a reason for
cost growth. This description is known as concurrency in the defense acquisition
11

community. The researchers explore the relationship between concurrency and cost
growth in large weapons programs (Birchler et al., 2011).
The researchers defined concurrency as the proportion of research, development,
and test and evaluation appropriations authorized during the same years in which
procurement appropriations are authorized. Their results strongly indicate that
concurrency does not necessarily predict cost growth. Using multiple regression
techniques, the researchers found no evidence supporting this relationship. To investigate
other relationships between cost growth and concurrency, they also used a smooth
curving technique. These experiments showed that, although the relationship is not
strong, low levels of concurrency can be more problematic than higher levels (Birchler et
al., 2011).
The findings associated with concurrency not significantly predicting cost growth
gives us motivation to investigate concurrency for our research as it relates to predicting
schedule duration. Perhaps a program with a planned level of concurrency could be
statistically significant in predicting schedule duration.
Giacomazzi III (2007)
This research presents an empirical model of schedule growth to evaluate the
impact of acquisition reform efforts, defense budget changes, unexpected inflation, and
major contingency operations (war) on schedule growth of major weapon systems. A
fixed-effects panel regression model was utilized to describe the schedule performance
(using earned value data) of the major weapon system programs managed by the Army,
Air Force, and Navy from 1980 to 2002. This research found that unexpected inflation
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results in increased schedule growth. In addition, the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000
series accounted for a reduction in schedule growth (Giacomazzi III, 2007: iv)
Because Giacomazzi (2007) found that unexpected inflation results in increased
schedule growth, we seek to mitigate any negative inflationary effects to our future model
by standardizing any cost and funding information collected in the data gathering
process. We seek to standardize said cost and funding information to the Base Year (BY)
that our research is being conducted in, and that is in Base Year 2016 (BY16).
Monaco and White (2005, 2006)
Monaco and White’s (2005, 2006) research centered on an AFIT SAR database
built by Sipple (2002) and modified by Bielecki (2003), Moore (2003), Genest (2004),
Lucas (2004), McDaniel (2004), and Rossetti (2004). Their modified research database
consisted of 52 program derived from this SAR database. Towards the end of his thesis,
Monaco (2005) noted some limitations.
One such limitation pertained to the predictive model. Monaco needed a complete
set of data in order for the statistical models to accurately predict the probability and
magnitude of schedule growth within the time frame of the EMD phase of acquisition
(defined as the interval between MS-B and MS-C). Monaco (2005) found that
approximately 27 percent of programs that otherwise met the researcher’s criteria did not
have a reported value for one of the four necessary 2 schedule dates, e.g. planned and
actual dates for MS-B and MS-C. Of the programs missing the appropriate schedule
dates, Planned MS-B, Actual MS-B, Planned MS-C, and Actual MS-C did not have
complete data 56, 28, 72, and 56 percent of the time, respectively (Monaco, 2005:106).
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In addition, Monaco (2005) observed the following missing schedule dates that
showed promise as possible predictor variables: First Unit Equipped (FUE), Preliminary
Design Review (PDR), Production Contract Award (PCA), Critical Design Review
(CDR), EMD Contract Award, and IOC. Due to the fact that the SARs contained missing
schedule information, Monaco could not decompose the interval between MS-B to MS-C
in order to create predictive models within smaller time frames. In particular, the FUE
schedule date also appeared to be very predictable but only present in 19.4 percent of the
programs (Monaco, 2005:106).
This is probably the closest research we have found as analogous to our scope of
our research. Whereas Monaco (2005) focused on building models to try to predict the
probability and magnitude of schedule growth, we feel value could also be added to a
program by predicting statistically significant schedule duration beforehand, in that it
could mitigate the probability and magnitude of schedule growth before it even happens.
Gailey III (2002)
Gailey (2002) expands the Reig (1995) study’s database from 24 to 46 programs
that have completed MS-B and reflect 28 program characteristics (Gailey III, 2002:5).
The results of the study stated that there appeared to be no correlation between LRIP
quantities and the probability that the schedule will slip (Gailey III, 2002:5). This fact
contradicts the results of Reig (1995) that Gailey expanded on, which used a smaller
database.
Gailey further concluded that of the 28 program characteristics examined, 16
exhibit scatter too extreme to provide reliable predictive power (Gailey III, 2002:11).
Although the remaining 12 program characteristics were not discussed specifically, the
14

findings relevant to this study reiterate that the use of competition and contract type
differentiate between a successful and unsuccessful program. Contrary to the previous
study, no differences were noted in MS-B success attributable to whether MS-B is
completed, which particular contractors are the lead, or whether the program is JointService (Gailey III, 2002:9).
Unger, Gallagher, and White (2001)
Unger et. al (2001) first recommends that the Weibull distribution is a better
predictor of RDT&E expenditure profiles than the Rayleigh distribution. Unger tests the
ability of both the Rayleigh and Weibull to predict variation and cost and schedule
growth, finding that the Weibull outperforms the Rayleigh when fit to individual
programs (Unger, 2001:5). The shape of the Weibull suggests a more front-loaded
profile. However, in his findings, Unger annotates a significant limitation of his model:
no method currently exists to estimate the Rayleigh and Weibull parameters for future
programs. Both this study and the work by Brown et al. (2015) share the common idea
that front-loaded funding for a program generally relates to lowering schedule growth.
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (2000)
Pioneered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
adopted by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Technology Readiness Level
(TRL) was used to determine the readiness of technologies incorporated into a weapon or
other type of system (Rodrigues, 2000:9). Measured on a scale of one to nine, the lower
the level of maturity when a technology was included in a development program, the
higher the risk that it would cause problems, such as schedule delays in the future
(Rodrigues, 2000:8).
15

According to NASA, AFRL, and others in DoD, a level of seven enables a
technology to be included in a development program with acceptable risk (Rodrigues,
2000:9). TRLs were also used in prior work to assess the impact of technological
maturity of product outcomes. A review of 23 different technologies into new product
and weapon systems designs within DoD and the commercial sector determined that cost
and schedule problems raise when programs start with technologies at low readiness
levels and it conversely showed that programs met product objectives when the
technologies were at higher levels of readiness (NASA, 2002). Perhaps TRL of a
program could serve to potentially explain predicted schedule duration at different TRL
levels going into MS-B.
Cashman (1995)
Cashman (1995), in his thesis, addresses three objectives: identifying actual
reasons for schedule problems across large Air Force system development efforts,
quantifying the importance of each category of reasons in terms of frequency and severity
in order to determine the categories of reasons most and least deserving of management
attention, and demonstrating that the reasons are not program unique but common across
system development efforts (Cashman, 1995:34).
Cashman used data available in Cost Performance Reports (CPRs) located within
the Aeronautical Systems Center cost library with funding over $40M limited to the
EMD phase specifically. The sample consisted of 22 system development efforts that
were ongoing or ended after 1984, described by 549 instances of schedule problems from
1982-1994 relating to aircraft/missile, simulator, aircraft equipment, and aircraft upgrade
(Cashman, 1995:25 and 35).
16

In order for meaningful identification of the reasons for schedule problems, and
the quantification of those reasons, it is necessary to group data into categories. “As each
reason for schedule problems and associated quantitative information was extracted from
the CPR, the reason was categorized based on its wording and the researcher’s five years
of experience as an Air Force project manager” (Cashman, 1995:31).
It is also noted by the researcher that reasons for schedule problems were not
program specific but common across most development efforts. “While all 22
development efforts did not experience all 20 categories of reasons for schedule
problems, no category appeared on only one effort, and on average, categories appeared
on 9.1 efforts” (Cashman, 1995:69).
Also noted by Drezner and Smith’s (1990) factors affecting schedules were
technical difficulty and concept stability. One reason for continued schedule overrun in
the procurement of major weapons systems over the years is the low level of technical
maturity of the system when it proceeds into the EMD phase. Once the development
phase begins, the government incurs a large fixed investment in the form of human
capital, facilities, and materials. Any changes thereafter may negatively affect schedule
duration.
In Figures 2 and 3, we see the chart of reasons for schedule variance based on
observations, as well as time duration of schedule variance in work days per category.
We look to this accumulated information regarding schedule variance as a group of
potential independent variables that could prove to be statistically significant in building
our multiple regression model that seeks to predict schedule duration.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Reasons for Schedule Variance by Category based on CPR’s
(Cashman, 1995:61)

Figure 3: Average Schedule Variance (work days) by Category based on CPR’s
(Cashman, 1995:6)
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Harmon and Om (1995)
This study is conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The data
collected consists of 22 missile programs with substantial developments from the mid1960s to the 1990s. The breakdown of the 22 programs is: eight surface-launched
interceptors, seven air-launched interceptors, and seven air-launched surface-attack
missiles (Harmon and Om, 1995: I-2). Although the focus of this study is on interceptor
missiles, inclusion of the attack missiles is used because attack missile programs tend to
be influenced by the same drivers and the missiles hardware also share many attributes
(Harmon and Om, 1995:II-1).
The 22 programs offer a variety of types in both program and missile attributes.
Ten of the 22 programs are modification programs based on previously developed
missiles (Harmon and Om, 1995:II-9). Development program schedules are decomposed
into 4 periods: 1) Time to first guided launch as measured from development start to first
guided launch, 2) Length of the development flight test program as measured from the
first guided launch to the end of initial operational testing, 3) Early production time as
measured from long-lead and full-funding release for the initial production lots to the first
production deliveries for those lots, and 4) Program length from first launch as measured
by the time from first guided launch to first production delivery (Harmon and Om,
1995:I-3).
The data for this study encounters the same variability in the data and therefore
uses delivery date of the first production missile to mark the end of development
(Harmon and Om, 1995:I-3-I-4). Although emphasis is placed on both pre-EMD and the
EMD phase of the acquisition cycle, schedule intervals in the concept exploration phases
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and the demonstration and validation phase prior to EMD are often highly dependent
upon political factors and therefore not emphasized. Pre-EMD prototype intervals on the
other hand are an exception (Harmon and Om, 1995:II-1).
The researchers originally wanted to develop a single equation to estimate the
interval of EMD defined as the period from EMD start to delivery of the first production
missile (Harmon and Om, 1995:III-1). “Unfortunately, the determinants of time to first
launch and time from first launch to first production are just too different” (Harmon and
Om, 1995:III-24). Instead they choose the interval between first guided-launch and the
first production delivery (Harmon and Om, 1995:III-1).
According to the research, time to first launch is a function of technological
variables whereas time from first launch to first production is a function of the number of
missiles launched in flight test, the rate at which they are launched, the overlap between
production start and flight test, and production time (Harmon and Om, 1995:III-25).
“Our hypothesis was that the terminal guidance system, generally the highest value item
and most technologically difficult development item, would pace overall missile
development” (Harmon and Om, 1995:II-9). The one program attribute that serves most
important in determining length of the development effort is the number of missiles
launched during flight tests (Harmon and Om, 1995:II-9).
Tyson, Harmon, and Utech (1994)
Unrelated to the four previous IDA studies, IDA performed an analysis on 20
tactical missile and seven tactical aircraft programs with the objective to describe costs
and schedule growth patterns associated with the acquisition of selected major systems,
identify reasons for the growth, and develop a way to predict growth in ongoing
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development and early production phases (Tyson, et al., 1994:iii). Data used for this
study comprises information obtained from SARs, historical memoranda to support DoD
program reviews, and from summaries of program data (Tyson, et al., 1994:S-1).
The study finds that programs take from 50 to 137 months from Milestone II to
IOC with only two of the twenty tactical missile programs finishing on time and the
highest development schedule growth exceeding its plan by 180 percent (Tyson et al.,
1994:S-2). Only two programs complete under budget with two other programs
exceeding their cost two-fold (Tyson et al., 1994:S-2).
The researchers examine the characteristics of programs with the highest and
lowest schedule and cost growth. The results are located in Table 1 and Table 2. (Tyson
et al., 1994:S-3 and S-4). The researchers state that keys to preventing schedule growth
in development are technical realism and a willingness to make tradeoffs and the keys to
preventing overall cost growth are correctly estimating the degree of technical difficulty
in the programs and maintaining the planned production schedule (Tyson et al., 1994:S2). The growth for aircraft is less dispersed than missile programs for multiple reasons.
In particular, they note this reason is due to the increased management scrutiny aircraft
programs incur and a protection from schedule stretch (Tyson et al., 1994:S-2).
Another finding from this research is that the major determinant of development
schedule growth is an increase in quantity; the need to produce more items for testing
than planned (Tyson et al., 1994:S-5 and S-6). Contrary to the 1990 RAND study, the
researchers in this study find a relationship between cost growth and schedule growth in
both development and production (Tyson et al., 1994:S-6; and Drezner and Smith,
1990:45).
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Table 2: Programs with High and Low Schedule Growth in Development
(Tyson et al., 1994:S-3)
Program
Low Growth
TOW 2
Sidewinder AIM-9M

% Growth
0%
1%

MLRS

6%

High Growth
Phoenix AIM-54A

94%

Maverick AGM-65D/G

98%

AMRAAM

129%

Sidewinder AIM-9L

148%

Sparrow AIM-7F

180%

Characteristics
Follow-on system
Follow-on system to fulfill goals of AIM-9L
Learned from unrealistic estimate of prior system
Urgent program
Competitive prototype
Requirements/schedule tradeoff made in favor of schedule
Problems resolved in development, not allowed to spill over into production
Testing delays
Delays in aircraft platform
Funding cut slowed development, allowed technology to catch up
Prototype
Vigorous testing program
Prototype showed infeasibility of approach
High concurrency, urgent program
Rushed testing
Urgent program, with fly-before-buy strategy
Technical problems, with increased development quantity
Joint service program, with technical disagreements
Underestimation of technical difficulty (vacuum tube to solid state)
Vigorous testing program

Table 3: Programs with Low and High Cost Growth in Total Program
(Tyson et al., 1994:S-4)
Program
Low Growth
MLRS

% Growth
-10%

Maverick AGM-65A

1%

TOW 2

-4%

Sidewinder AIM-9M

10%

High Growth
AMRAAM

84%

Phoenix AIM-54C

89%

Sparrow AIM-7M

100%

Sidewinder AIM-9L

123%

Characteristics
Competitive prototype
Requirement lowered because of time urgency
Multiyear procurement, low stretch
Total package procurement with low concurrency
Vigorous testing program
Low stretch
Urgent modification program
Foreign Military Sales
Low stretch
Learned from schedule problems in AIM-9L program
Urgent program, took its lumps in development
Low stretch
Prototype showed infeasibility of approach
High concurrency, rushed testing
Stretched program, dual sourcing
High concurrency
Dual-sourced for technical reasons
Five year qualifying for two years of competition
Needed funding for next generation
Competitive prototype, low cost growth in development
Needed funding for next generation
Crash program
Dual-sourced for technical reasons
Production stretch
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Fitcher, Arnold, and Allen (1992)
Fitcher et al. (1992) presents a historical perspective of DoD programs schedule
performance based on 35 Army, 46 Navy, and 24 Air Force programs from the December
1991 SARs. The purpose of the study is to provide a point estimate and range for the
expected schedule duration of future programs by creating probability distributions of
past schedule durations within certain intervals. The intervals are: 1) Milestone I –
Milestone II, 2) Milestone II - Milestone III, 3) Program start to First flight, 4) Program
start to First unit equipped, and 5) Program start IOC. The program interval that most
closely relates to our research is the interval from Milestone II to Milestone III.
Although this study in no way tries to predict the schedule duration of a specific
interval based on predictor variables, it does provide an ability to check the realism of
schedules proposed by the program managers. The probability distributions are
compared by service and by intervals to give a range of values as “Most likely” and
schedule expectations considered overly optimistic or pessimistic (Fitcher et al., 1992:2).
Results from this study show that no marked difference exists among the data from each
service and based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test with an alpha of
0.05, all data could be fit to both the normal and the Beta distributions (Fitcher et al.,
1992:9).
Also noted, based on the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) results, is that the only
significant difference among the Services (given an alpha level of 0.05) is a longer than
average time for Air Force programs compared to the Army and Navy between Milestone
II and Milestone III. Service type could prove to be a productive independent variable
for our research.
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Drezner and Smith (1990)
The results by Drezner and Smith (1990) show the average time to complete a
program increases by two years when comparing the timeframes of the 1950s and 60s to
the 1970s and 80s. This equates to one year for Phase I and one year for Phase II at a
confidence level of 99 and 95 percent, respectively (Drezner and Smith, 1990:9 and 11).
However, the authors note that the year the program started fails to capture 90 percent of
schedule variance (adj R2 = 0.10) (Drezner and Smith, 1990:9). The results of the study
also show the variability of the schedule duration increasing (Drezner and Smith, 1990:
vi). Although knowing the duration and variability of schedule is important,
understanding what factors make up the duration and affect the variability are imperative.
The researchers of the 1990 RAND study identified 16 potential factors that
influence the original schedule and/or subsequent deviations; we list them in Figure 1.
Based on statistical analysis of ten programs, the results of the study suggest the
following influences on the original schedule estimate: 1) competition and prototyping
lengthens schedule and 2) concurrency and adequate funding shortens schedule (Drezner
and Smith, 1990:30). Results also suggest the following influences on schedule slips: 1)
unstable funding, 2) technical difficulty, 3) external guidance, and 4) external events
(Drezner and Smith, 1990:33). Two commonly held hypotheses that prove inconclusive
is that longer planning phases incur less slippage, and that cost and schedule growth are
interrelated (Drezner and Smith, 1990:40 and 45). However, the authors state, “Our
inability to establish these relationships may be due in part to the small database
available” (Drezner and Smith, 1990: viii). This study provides a good foundation from
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which to proceed forward, but the relatively small data set limits our ability to gain clarity
on variables that would be most influential in predicting development schedule.
Factors Affecting Schedule
Factors Affecting Original Plan
1. Competition
2. Concurrency (overlap of effort between development and production phase)
3. Funding adequacy
4. Inclusion of prototype phase
5. If the program's phases were contracted separately
6. Service priority
(Drezner and Smith, 1990: 21-22)
Factors Affecting Program Deviation
1. Contractor performance
2. External events
3. Funding stability
4. Major requirements stability
5. Program manager turnover

(Drezner and Smith, 1990: 23-24)

Factors Affecting Original Plan and/or Program Deviation
1. External guidance
2. Single service or joint management
3. Program complexity
4. Technical Difficulty
5. Concept stability (System specification maturity)
(Drezner and Smith, 1990: 23)

Figure 4: Drezner and Smith’s Sixteen Schedule Factors
Harmon, Ward, and Palmer (1989)
Harmon et al. (1989) attempt to provide methods for assessing the reasonableness
of proposed acquisition schedules. This particular study, consisting of data collected
from nine tactical aircraft programs, performs analyses on schedule intervals and
provides a schedule assessment tool that spans the period from Full Scale Development
(FSD) (now referred to as EMD) start through full-rate production (Harmon et al.,
1989:1).
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The programs chosen with development occurring from the early 1970s to early
1980s are based on the newness of the program, its importance in historical perspective,
and the expected availability of data (Harmon et al., 1989:17). Development program
schedules are decomposed into 5 periods: 1) Length of pre-FSD activity, 2) Period from
FSD start to first flight, 3) Length of the development flight test program, 4) Early
production time, and 5) Total FSD program length (as defined by the period from FSD
start to the delivery of the 24th production aircraft) (Harmon et al., 1989:2). Although
the researchers refer to these periods as “intervals” they are not mutually exclusive in that
certain intervals overlap.
The data is collected from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military
services, contractors, and third parties (studies and databases at IDA, RAND, etc). They
obtain cost and technical data from government sources and prime contractors while
schedule data is obtained from SARs, contractors, and the services sources (Harmon et
al., 1989:17-18).
The program attributes prove to play an important role in explaining variations in
interval length. Under the program attribute of the prime contractor, it is estimated that
McDonnell Aircraft programs require 15 percent more time than the other four contractor
types (Harmon et al, 1989:47). The data also shows that prototype programs require 11
percent less time than programs that do not develop prototypes (Harmon et al, 1989:47).
The schedule driver data collected in Figure 5 may be further explored in the building of
our model. It should be noted however, not all of these drivers are applicable to our
model, since information such as the weight of a completed prototype of low-rate
production unit will not be available pre-MS-B.
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Candidate Schedule Drivers for Tactical Aircraft
Program Characteristics
1. Military Service
2. Prime Contractor
3. Whether the system was prototyped
4. If the acquisition strategy included contractor teaming
5. If there was separate engine development
6. Number of EMD aircraft built
Aircraft Characteristics
1. Empty weight (lbs.)
2. Combat weight (lbs.)
3. Maximum speed (knots)
4. Thrust to weight ratio at combat weight
5. Mission radius
6. The percentages of titanium and composites used in the airframe structure
(Harmon et al, 1989:19)

Figure 5: Harmon, Ward, and Palmer Schedule Drivers for Tactical Aircraft
Harmon and Ward (1989)
The approach used in this study in many ways parallels that used for the previous
study. The data consists of fourteen air-launched missile programs (seven air-to-air and
seven air-to-surface systems) that involve substantial developments from the mid-1960s
to the late 1980s. Development program schedules are decomposed into 4 periods: 1)
Time to first guided launch as measured from FSD start to first guided launch, 2) Length
of the development flight test program as measured from the first guided launch to the
end of initial operational testing, 3) Early production time as measured from long-lead
and full-funding release for the initial production lots to the first production deliveries for
those lots, and 4) Program length from first launch as measured by the time from first
guided launch to first production delivery.
In the previous study of tactical aircraft, the end of development is stated as the
time when 24 aircraft are delivered. Using this methodology for missiles leads to
inconsistencies across programs because production rates associated with different types
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of missiles vary widely. The researchers decide to use delivery date of the first
production missile to mark the end of development (Harmon and Ward, 1989:3).
The data is collected from military services, prime contractors, and third parties
(studies and databases at IDA, RAND, etc) with schedule and missiles characteristic data
obtained from SARs, numerous government sources, (Harmon and Ward, 1989:8).
Collected schedule drivers in Figure 6 may be further explored for the purpose of our
research.
Candidate Schedule Drivers for Air-Launched Missiles
Program Characteristics
1. Military Service
2. Prime Contractor
3. Whether the system was prototyped
4. If the system was new or a modification
5. Number of prototype missiles
6. Number of prototype launches
7. Number of development missiles
8. Number of development launches
Missile Characteristics
1. Primary targets
2. Guidance type
3. Length (ft.)
4. Diameter (in.)
5. Total weight (lbs.)
6. Guidance weight
7. Missile Cross-Section (in.2)
8. Guidance weight/Cross Section
9. Range (nautical miles)
10. Mach speed
11. Total Impulse (lbs. * sec.)
(Harmon and Ward, 1989:9-10)

Figure 6: Harmon and Ward Schedule Drivers for Air-Launched Missiles
The researchers originally wanted to develop a single equation to predict the
interval of FSD defined as the period from FSD start to delivery of the first production
missile (Harmon and Ward, 1989:23). Due to the fact that the determinants of time to
first launch and time from first launch to first production are vastly different, the
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researchers choose the interval between first guided-launch and the first production
delivery (Harmon and Ward, 1989:36).
According to the research, time to first launch is a function of technological
variables whereas time from first launch to first production is a function of the number of
missiles launched in flight test, the rate at which they are launched, the overlap between
production start and flight test, and production time (Harmon and Ward, 1989:36).
The researchers believe that the most important determinant of overall
development program length is length of the flight test program. Being that flight test
duration is determined by the number of test missiles launched and the rate at which test
launches are accomplished, it is no surprise that the one program attribute that served
most important in determining length of the development effort was the number of
missiles launched during flight tests (Harmon and Ward, 1989:13).
Tyson, Nelson, Om, and Palmer (1989)
This study conducted by the IDA examines schedule variances and their causes.
The database consists of nine tactical aircraft, nine electronic aircraft, five helicopters,
eight other aircraft, 16 air-launched tactical munitions, 18 surface-launched tactical
munitions, 10 electronic systems, 10 strategic missiles, and four satellites. The database
is divided into four periods: 1960s, early 1970s, late 1970s, and 1980s to compare
schedule growth between different timeframes. The results of schedule slippage within
the development phase are as follows: 1960s = 46 percent, early 1970s = 24%, late 1970s
= 37%, and 1980s = 21% (Tyson et al., 1989:IV-2). The results of schedule slippage
within the production phase are as follows: 1960s = 64%, early 1970s = 84%, late 1970s
= 69%, and 1980s = 7% (Tyson et al., 1989:IV-2).
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The main focus of their study was to determine the effect, if any, on schedule
overruns, from: 1) prototyping, 2) competition, 3) multi-year procurement, 4) design-to
cost, 5) sole-source procurement and fixed-price development, and 6) contract incentives,
variables investigated in previous findings that we have documented. Use of prototyping
shows a reduction in the development phase and the overall schedule by 11 and 15
percent, respectively (Tyson et al., 1989:VIII-6 – VIII-7). Competitive programs produce
43 percent more design-schedule growth and 39 percent more production schedule
growth, compared to non-competitive programs (Tyson et al., 1989:VII-7). Programs
utilizing multiyear-procurement experience seven percent less production schedule
growth (Tyson et al., 1989:VI-8). Design-to-cost exhibited development schedule growth
of 12 percent and production schedule growth of two percent (Tyson et al., 1989:IX-11).
Production schedule growth is reduced by 27 percent when sole-source procurement is
used (Tyson et al., 1989:X-7). Under a fixed-price contract strategy, development
schedule growth showed a reduction of six percent (Tyson et al., 1989:X-13). It should be
noted that no comparison was made between contract incentives and schedules, as that
could have been a separate catalyst.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we review a multitude of studies that examined various datasets
while performing a plethora of statistical procedures all in the pursuit of explaining and
predicting schedule duration and variance. It is from these studies that we identify the
characteristics that drive acquisition schedules and derive our own list of predictor
variables. The accumulation of these predictor variables found throughout the literature
review give us a strong foundation from which we can purposefully collect data and
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explain our methodology in predicting schedule duration to IOC for defense acquisition
programs.
Although the studies reviewed in this chapter differ in the number of programs,
the source of data, and methodologies used, they prove beneficial in providing insight
into the methodology and predictor variables needed for our research. From past studies,
we identified many reasons of schedule growth, schedule variance, and schedule
estimating relationships that we wish to investigate as they may be applicable to creating
our database and building our regression model. However, it must be noted that not all of
the identified variables and relationships may be available in the form of SAR data, thus
we now begin the process to manage what information we do have available to us in the
SAR. Furthermore, we now develop a foundation from which to begin the methodology
for predicting most schedule duration to IOC for defense acquisition programs. The
following chapter seeks to addresses the methodology in detail.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter explains the procedures we use to conduct our research. First, we
discuss the data source to include its limitations and the process to select and compile the
data. Second, define our response variable as it relates to our research question and
objectives. Next, we discuss our search for predictor variables, and define candidate
predictor variables. We then discuss using preliminary data analysis for the model.
Lastly, we discuss the application of a multiple regression analysis, which serves as the
statistical cornerstone for predicting a realistic schedule duration for a given acquisitions
program.
Database
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Monaco and White (2005, 2006) used a
database that had been built and modified over the years by students at AFIT. Because
this database is at least 11 years old at this point, we create and employ an entirely new
database. The database we utilize for our research is a database originally built by the
RAND Corporation for the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA). The SAR
database is populated with SAR data on approximately 330 defense acquisition programs.
The said SAR database, which is built electronically using separate Microsoft® Excel
sheets per program, is in the format of large portfolios of programs grouped by service.
The information housed in this major database includes, but is not limited to, vital cost
and schedule data necessary for our study.
The database consists of program SARs dating back to the 1950’s. Our research
seeks to use all programs that contain SAR data that is relevant, applicable, and available
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for our multiple regression model. Programs included in the study will contain Air Force,
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. programs. With respect to program type limitations, a
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on space programs that was
presented before the U.S. Senate on 11 May, 2011 states:
“Despite decades of significant investment, most of the Department of Defense's
(DoD) large space acquisition programs have collectively experienced billions of
dollars in cost increases, stretched schedules, and increased technical risks.
Significant schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in potential
capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather
monitoring. These problems persist, with other space acquisition programs still
facing challenges in meeting their targets and aligning the delivery of assets with
appropriate ground and user systems.” (GAO, 2011)
Because of the GAO’s contemporary findings on extreme cost and schedule growth in
space programs despite significant investment to try to mitigate said growth, we choose
to exclude space programs from our database to try to preserve the accuracy of our model
as it will relate to all other program types.
The SAR database includes program information of all programs, regardless of
whether the program was terminated or not. We choose to only include programs that
completed IOC. We do this because a cost estimator develops schedule durations based
on the idea that the program will be successful and complete IOC. Using successful
program data is important because we seek to create regression models that emulate
successful programs, which in turn may provide the cost estimator a tool to create a
successful development schedule based on past successful program data.
For our study criteria, we consider any program with a “MS-II” labeling to be
synonymous with “MS-B” based on each of their respective definitions (Harmon
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2012:11). Also, we only include programs that complete the EMD phase up to reported
IOC. U.S. Code: Title 10: Section 2432 states:
“The requirements of this section with respect to a major defense acquisition
program shall cease to apply after 90 percent of the items to be delivered to the
United States under the program (shown as the total quantity of items to be
purchased under the program in the most recent Selected Acquisition Report)
have been delivered or 90 percent of planned expenditures under the program
have been made.” (US Code, 2004)
When a program meets the above criteria, one last SAR report based on the
estimate is submitted. This SAR is the one we use to populate our database. It is
necessary to wait until a program completes the EMD phase all the way through to the
IOC phase to ensure we capture the actual completion date. This determines the amount
of schedule duration we use as our dependent variable in model creation.
Furthermore, because we seek to predict schedule duration from the beginning of
MS-B to IOC, a major focus of our research database is to include SARs that contain preMS-B data. This is significant in that defense acquisition programs are officially initiated
at MS-B, and data collection for programs is highly scrutinized at MS-B and beyond.
Unfortunately, program data (funding, schedule, etc.) on a program before it is officially
initiated at MS-B is not always as highly scrutinized because it is not officially a program
at that point in time, and therefore pre-MS-B data is not always as readily available as
post-MS-B data.
All the aforementioned characteristics of a program’s SAR serves as strict data
entry criteria for creation of our research database. SARs that had all of the
characteristics except one was not considered due to the fact that incomplete data on a
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program would not be of use in analyzing that data, nor would incomplete data be useful
in the multiple regression model we seek to build.
With respect to the SAR database, an iterative process of criteria (Figure 3) was
applied to all of the programs in the database as to filter for only programs we could use
for our study.
Table 4: Process of Database Filtering

This filtering process helped us get to the sample size of 56 programs we use for our
research. First, we seek to filter out all space programs, as previously mentioned. Second,
we seek to use only programs that give us both MS-B and IOC dates, as this will be our
response variable. Next we look for RDT&E funding data as it relates to a percentage of
total RDT&E funds allocation at MS-B. This idea comes from Brown et al. (2015) and
Unger (2001) who found that front-loading a program’s RDT&E funding has a
correlation to lessened schedule growth. In order for a percentage to be calculated, there
needs to be at least one year prior to MS-B of RDT&E funding data. This criteria filtered
out the most programs simply due to the fact that many of the final SARs in the database
only showed funding data at MS-B and thereafter. Finally, the last criteria also relates
back to the Brown et al. (2015) and Unger (2001) findings in that calculating RDT&E
funds percentage allocated at MS-B can best be captured from clearly defined MS-A
start, finish, and funding data.
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Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Data
The SAR contains an array of major defense acquisition program data from all
military services. At a minimum, this data includes schedule, cost, budget, and
performance characteristics of defense programs. Although the criteria for a program to
be classified as ACAT I change over time, the programs within the SAR consistently
represent programs of high interest to the government. The SAR data can include both
classified and unclassified information. For security reasons, we only include
unclassified information in our database.
As seen in the literature review, SAR data is commonly used to conduct research
on both schedule and cost growth. Even though the government has made improvements
in both quality and consistency of information within SAR data, there are still many
weaknesses with respect to data collection and reporting that get manifested in missing or
incomplete data (Hough, 1992:v). Inconsistencies exist due to the fact that guidelines
change over time, and specific details vary from program to program leading to
complications with interprogram comparisons (Hough, 1992:4). Even with the traditional
limitations associated with SAR data, it still remains a logical source of data for our
research due to the wide range of information it has on programs that are of high interest
to the government.
Response Variable
This research utilizes a multiple regression approach to predicting program
schedule duration. We express the multiple regression response as time duration in
months for our modeling database, although the predicted response more than likely will
have remaining time expressed as a decimal of a month. Therefore for usage of the
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model, we suggest rounding the predicted response to a whole number. The overall time
duration in months starts at EMD, through the Production and Deployment, LRIP, and
IOT&E phases, and concludes at IOC.
For our multiple regression model conducted in JMP®, our response variable is as
follows:


MS-B to IOC (Months) [Regression Output]
o This variable states the actual time it took from MS-B to IOC for a
given program. This data is unavailable to the cost estimator at the
time they are developing a cost estimate.

The accuracy of the “MS-B to IOC (Months)” response variable will be dependent on the
strength of the predictor variables associated to it in the multiple regression model.
Search for Predictors of Schedule Duration
Our past studies discussed in Chapter II identify possible predictor variables as
they relate to our research. To be of value in the application of cost estimating, it is
imperative the explanatory (independent) variables are both understandable and available
to the cost estimator when the program office begins the schedule estimate as part of the
cost estimate.
A variable that is predictive yet confusing, or unavailable to the estimator, is
essentially worthless if it cannot be communicated to an audience, or understood by
another user. For this reason, we create models consisting of clearly defined variables
that the cost estimator is confident in. This produces a model that has utility and is easily
defendable. In the search for predictors, we do not mandate a causal relationship to the
response variable, but the independent variable must exhibit some logical link to the
response variable that the cost estimator can easily understand. Furthermore, along with
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the cost estimator being able to understand the independent variable, the data associated
with the independent variable should accessible in common reporting standards.
Predictor Variables
The candidate explanatory variables used in the multiple regression model to
predict schedule duration come exclusively from the SAR database. With strict data entry
criteria applied to creating our research database, the predictor variables found have some
logical link to the program, and should be readily available to the cost estimator on a
given SAR deliverable. Our final regression model, described next in Chapter IV, only
includes those predictor variables that prove statistically significant at α=0.05 level of
significance. Next, we list and describe the predictor variables considered for inclusion
in the multiple regression model.
All of these were found across all 56 programs of our modified SAR database:
[Note: only relevant categorical variables are listed here if that particular type of program
was in the database. Since there are no ships in our research database, there is no
explanatory variable listed as Ship. The same can be said for Tank, etc.]


MS-A to MS-B Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the total time it took in months for a program to
complete MS-A to MS-B according to the last SAR date. In this
variable we are only concerned with actual schedule duration data
available to the cost estimator at the time of Milestone B/EMD start.



Quantity Expected at MS-B – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the estimate of total quantity of weapons
systems that were expected to be produced at MS-B at the time of the
last SAR date.



RDT&E $ (M) at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on simply raw total RDT&E dollars (in
millions) that were allocated to the program before, and up to the start
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of MS-B. The dollars were all standardized into the current base year
at the time of this research (BY16).



% of RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on the percent of available RDT&E dollars
allocated to the program before, and up to the start of MS-B. While
this variable is based on a percentage, the dollars that this % was
derived from were all standardized into the current base year at the
time of this research (BY16).



Modification – Binary Variable
o This variable is concerned with programs whose existence serves as a
modification to a pre-existing weapons system. If a weapons system is
a modification, it does not necessarily mean it will not have pre-MS-B
data associated with it. Every program is different, and therefore it
cannot be assumed that a modification will automatically start at MSB.



Prototype – Binary Variable
o This variable includes is concerned with programs that create a
prototype, or prototypes, of a weapons system before production of
that weapons system begins. More than one type of prototype for a
weapons system can be created in a given program.



Concurrency Planned – Binary Variable
o This variable addresses planned concurrency in a given program prior
to MS-B. Concurrency is the proportion of RDT&E dollars that are
authorized during the same years that Procurement appropriations are
authorized. The planned level of concurrency forces managers to make
decisions that can lead to [schedule] growth if either too much or too
little concurrency is accepted for a given program (Birchler et al,
2011:246).



1985 or Later for MS-B Start – Binary Variable
o This variable accounts for a time series trend of programs that started
their MS-B in 1985 or later. It is shown that programs which began
development during 1985 or later (considered “contemporary”) expend
a greater percentage of obligations by their schedule midpoint than the
earlier pre-1985 programs. We attribute this difference to the
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense (commonly called
the Packard Commission) and the subsequent acquisition reforms.



MS-B Start Year – Continuous Variable
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o This variable addresses the year in which MS-B started. Much like the
“1985 or Later for MS-B Start” predictor variable shown above, the
actual year in which MS-B started has the probability of significance
on the schedule duration of a program.


Air Force – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Air Force.



Navy – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Navy.



Army – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Army.



Marine Corps – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Marine Corps.



Aircraft – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an aircraft
program, regardless of service it is associated with. The criteria to
qualify as an aircraft for this variable is any weapons system whose
primary function is flight; both rotary-wing and fixed-wing programs.



Fighter Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a fighter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Bomber Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a bomber
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Helo Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a helicopter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Cargo Plane Program – Binary Variable
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o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a cargo plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.


Tanker Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a tanker
plane program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Electronic Warfare Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
warfare program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. An electronic warfare program, as not to be confused
with an electronic system program, differs greatly in that its main
function(s). A description from Lockheed Martin makes the distinction
that it involves the ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum –
signals such as radio, infrared or radar – to sense, protect, and
communicate. At the same time, it can be used to deny adversaries the
ability to either disrupt or use these signals (Electronic Warfare
Products).



Trainer Plane Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a trainer
plane program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Missile Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a missile
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.



Electronic System Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
system program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. This differs greatly from the previously described
electronic warfare variable in that electronic systems programs are
principally concerned with the electronic user interface of a system,
avionics controls, or other similar applications that primarily support
the electronic usability of a system, or system of systems.



Submarine Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a submarine
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with.
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Contractor (Name of Defense Contractor(s)) – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies the name of the lead defense contractor for a
given weapons system program. If the effort on a program involved
more than one contractor, a variable was created with all named
contractors sharing that variable.
ACAT I – Binary Variable
o This variable makes the distinction if the program is an ACAT I
program, or not. This is significant in that ACAT I programs deal with
a much larger dollar amount, and thus are more susceptible to cost and
schedule growth by way of their large-scale and complexity efforts.

Validation Pool
Once all data is gathered across all 56 programs, we randomly select 20 percent of
the 56 programs to serve as our validation pool. This means we build our multiple
regression model with the data of 45 programs, while the other 11 completed programs’
data is used to test the multiple regression model against for accuracy of output.
Exploratory Data Analysis
Inherent in building a valid, statistically significant multiple regression model is
the application of various statistical techniques that can further help us to create the most
robust model possible. It should be noted that a test for independence is not part of our
exploratory data analysis. Due to the fact we use only one SAR to obtain data for any one
program, we assume independence is met, although we have no way of statistically
testing this assumption.
Variance Inflation Factors
One of the first analyses done in the exploration of the data involves looking at
the variance inflation factors (VIF) scores. We seek to display and analyze the VIF scores
of any predictor variables that prove to be statistically significant. Variance inflation is a
consequence of multicollinearity and the VIF scores are a common way for detecting
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such a relationship (Stine, 1995). When an independent variable is nearly a linear
combination of other independent variables in the model, the affected estimates are
unstable and exhibit high standard errors. This is due to a linear dependency between two
or more independent variables where the value of one predictor is dependent upon
another (Stine, 1995). “A VIF of 10 suggests that it is large enough to indicate a
problem” (Stine, 1995).
Cook’s Distance Test
To make sure there are no overly influential data points that are creating skewed
outputs in our model, we look to Cook’s Distance test, commonly referred to as “Cook’s
D” (Cook, 1977). Cook's D is a commonly used estimate of the influence of data point(s)
when performing a regression analysis. Cook's D can be used in several ways: to indicate
data points that are particularly worth investigating for validity, to indicate regions of a
space where it would be good to be able to obtain more data points, or even removing
data points that appear to be overly influential in our regression model. All of these uses
of Cook’s D should be applied on a case by case basis. For the purpose of our research,
we look to Cook’s D to check for any program data that is overly influential to our model
using JMP®. Typically, we are justified in removing a data point when the Cook’s D
value is 0.5 or greater. A Cook’s D value that is greater than 0.5 indicates that an
influential data point exists (Neter et al., 1996:381).
Studentized Residuals
In juxtaposition with Cook’s D, which looks for influential data points, we also
look at the histogram of studentized residuals to identify potential outliers. If we detect
any potential outliers in the studentized residual histogram, we further explore on an
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individual basis to see if the outlier should be kept in the regression model. This anomaly
could indicate a data transcription issue, a rare occurrence, an atypical program, or for a
host of reasons that cannot be explained. For purposes of our research, we consider any
program whose studentized residual is either 3 standard deviations above or below then
standard normal distribution’s mean of zero. This is in keeping assumption a normal
distribution of the residuals, which we discuss next.
Shapiro-Wilk’s Test
Any multiple regression model that we ultimately settle upon must have its model
residuals pass the assumption of being normally distributed and possessing constant
variance. These two assumptions are needed to satisfy/maintain the validity of the
models’ p-values.
The Shapiro-Wilk’s (S-W) goodness of fit test (Neter et al., 1996: 111) addresses
the normality assumption. The S-W test is a way to statistically determine whether a
random sample comes from a normal distribution or not. We use a threshold of α = 0.05
to conduct this test. The null hypothesis for the S-W is that the model residuals possess a
normal distribution. The alternative hypothesis is that they do not. If the p-value for the
S-W is larger than 0.05, then we can satisfy the assumption of normality for the data in
our model.
Breusch-Pagan Test
Following this, we test our final model assumption of constant variance of the
error term using the Breusch-Pagan (B-P) test (Neter et al., 1996:239). This test for
constant variance in a regression model is used with the purpose of identifying whether
heteroscedasticity is present in the model or not. Heteroscedasticity refers to the
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circumstance in which the variance of an explanatory variable is not constant (unequal)
across the range of values of a different variable that predicts it. In order to have the most
robust regression model possible, having as close to equal constant variance as possible is
most advantageous.
We conduct the B-P test for our research using Microsoft® Excel after obtaining
data inputs via JMP®. In order to pass the assumption of constant variance using the B-P
test, the p-value output from the test must be above 0.05. Similar to the S-W test, the null
hypothesis states that our assumption with respect to the model’s residuals (for the B-P
test, this is constant variance) holds.
Stepwise Regression
We use the process of stepwise regression to assist us in determining which
explanatory variables prove both individually predictive as well collectively predictive.
The stepwise function in JMP® gives give us a preliminary regression model to work
with, and all of the aforementioned exploratory data analysis methods will be conducted
following the output of a preliminary multiple regression model. Thus, chronologically, a
multiple regression analysis is run first, but it will not be used or considered significant
until all exploratory data analysis methods are conducted and satisfied.
We use the mixed direction within the stepwise regression in lieu of the forward
and backwards option. The purpose of this is to optimize both the fitting routine as well
as to prevent carrying non-predictive variables once more predictive variables are added
to the preliminary regression model.
We use a p-value threshold of 0.05 for an explanatory variable to enter the model
as well as a value of 0.05 to leave the model. That is, for an initial explanatory variable
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to be entered into the regression model, it must have a p-value of less 0.05. Once within
the model, if it ever reaches a p-value of greater than 0.05 (once other explanatory
variables are included) stepwise then removes this variable.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The last step of our model building process involves the ultimate finalization of
our multiple regression model once stepwise has produced an initial model and we have
ascertained there are no issues (and tested that) with respect to multicollinearity (VIF
scores), influential data points (Cook’s D), outliers (studentized residuals) and satisfied
the assumption of normality (S-W test) and constant variance (B-P). The structure of the
finalized model reflects the standard linear multiple regression equation (1).

Yi   0  1 X 1i   2 X 2i ...   k X ki   i (McClave et al., 2001:557)
Where:

(1)

Yi - Outcome of Dependent Variable (response) for ith experimental/sample unit
X i - Level of Independent (predictor) variable for ith experimental/sample unit
0  1 X i - Linear /systematic relation between Yi and Xi (conditional mean)
0 - Mean of Y when X=0 (Y-intercept)
1 - Change in mean of Y when X increases by 1 (slope)
i - Random error term

In this finalization, we also seek to make sure that the final model is statistically
significant at our chosen experimentwise error rate of 0.05, but that we also ensure each
explanatory variable is significant with respect to its respective comparisonwise error
rate. This later requirement is necessary such that we don’t erroneously violate the
experimentwise error rate for the overall model’s F test while conducting multiple t-tests
for the individual model parameters.
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This later step requires us to adopt a procedure to control for the overall Type I
error rate by adopting a familywise error rate procedure. For this research, we utilize the
Bonferroni Correction (Bonferroni, 2015). The application of this corrective measure is
an adjustment made to P-values when several dependent or independent statistical tests
are being performed simultaneously on a single data set. To perform a Bonferroni
Correction, divide the P-value (α) by the number of comparisons being made (m). The
output of this will give us αc which will be the threshold by which each P-value must be
less than to remain in the model. If an independent variable gets removed from the
regression model by way of the Bonferroni Correction, a new iteration will be conducted
with a new value for the number of comparisons (m), which will in turn create a newly
calculated αc threshold. This is an iterative process and can take multiple iterations, but it
serves as strong conservative measure to avoid the potential of having a lot of spurious
positives in the testing of the data set (Bonferroni, 2015). The only way an independent
variable can remain in the model is if it fails the threshold by only a small margin (and
small is contextual), and in each case an analysis will be conducted on the importance of
keeping said independent variable in the model.
The multiple regression model can only be considered complete and valid upon
passing all phases of the exploratory data analysis. If at any point the multiple regression
model fails any phase of the exploratory data analysis, proper remedial measures will be
taken, and an iterative process will take place until significant results are present in a
model.
Descriptive performance measures we utilize for the multiple regression analysis
are the R2 and Adjusted R2 outputs. The R2 is a statistical measure of how close the data
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fit to the regression line. It is also known as the coefficient of determination, or the
coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression. An R2 of 0 indicates that the
model explains none of the variability of the response data around its mean, while R2
values closer to 1 have a much stronger explanation. Adjusted R2 has been adjusted for
the number of predictors in the model. The Adjusted R2 increases only if the new term
improves the model more than would be expected by chance. It decreases when a
predictor improves the model by less than expected by chance. Adjusted R2 ensures we
do not arbitrarily add variables to the model that are not predictive. Adjusted R2 ensures
we do not arbitrarily add variables to the model that are not predictive.

 (n  1) 
(1  R 2 ) (McClave et al., 2001:557)
Adjusted R2 = 1  

 n  (k  1) 

(2)

Where:
n= the number of data points
k= the number of independent variables in the model
As seen in (2), the value of Adjusted R2 decreases when we add additional
variables to the model. If the added variable increases the explained variance noted in
R2, Adjusted R2 increases. Therefore, this counterbalance ensures that we add variables
whose predictability warrants the additional complexity of the model (McClave et al.,
2001:557).
Validation of Multiple Regression Model
The final model is tested against our validation pool. Our model, consisting of 45
programs, is tested against our validation pool of 11 programs. Two measures of this
validation takes place. First, we compute the Absolute Percent Error (APE) for each
program and then determine the Mean and Median Absolute Percent Error (MAPE and
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MdAPE) for both sets of data. The APE equals | actual MS-B to IOC (months) minus
predicted MS-B to IOC (months) | divided by actual MS-B to IOC (months). The
MdAPE and MAPE measure the average prediction accuracy of each regression model’s
outputs. We then compare the MdAPE and MAPE to check that they behave the same as
both the larger sample and smaller sample should exude similar percent errors in their
characteristics.
Once the MdAPE and MAPE are compared, we then construct a predicted by
actuals bivariate plot to compare the regression line of both graphs. Once again, we check
to see that both the main model and model built from the validation pool behave in a
similar fashion. If our main model holds up against both measures of the MdAPE and
MAPE comparison, as well as the bivariate plot, we can combine the original 45
programs with the 11 programs of the validation pool, and we can create a finalized
model using all 56 programs.
Chapter Summary
We use the results of our literature review as a foundation for our analytical
process. This chapter details our foundation by describing our research methodology. We
explore the use of SAR data, describe our process of data collection, and explain our
creation of predictor variables that provide a link to the response variable. We provide
reasoning for the use of our methodology and provide a detailed explanation of the
exploratory data analysis conducted on the data to further help us create the most robust
model possible. We drive forward into the next chapter to introduce the results of our
model building process.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter provides the results from the methodology outlined in Chapter III.
First, using our model pool of 45 defense acquisition programs, we run a preliminary
multiple regression analysis in JMP® using the stepwise function. Second, we conduct
our data analysis techniques on the preliminary multiple regression model as a means to
validate assumptions about the model, which gives us a final model. Next, using our
finalized multiple regression model, we measure, compare, and discuss our statistically
significant predictor variables. Then we discuss the explanatory power of our model
overall using the R2 and Adjusted R2 values. Finally, we judge the performance of our
finalized multiple regression model by testing it against our validation pool of 11
programs, along with measuring the validation performance as it relates to raw output
accuracy with respect to the MdAPE and MAPE range.
Preliminary Multiple Regression Model
Applying the stepwise function in JMP® to our data on 45 programs, we arrive at
the output displayed in Figure 7. This figure shows us that our preliminary model appears
to display many characteristics that would help us to predict schedule duration to IOC for
a given program.
In our preliminary model, we note the presence of many of the predictor variables
that were detailed in Chapter III. Also detailed in Chapter III, the Bonferroni Correction
can be applied to the model, as a conservative measure to avoid any potential spurious
positives from testing the model.
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Figure 7: Preliminary Multiple Regression Model Output
Applying the Bonferroni Correction to this preliminary model requires us to
calculate αc by accounting for all of the independent variables, except the intercept, and
dividing that number by the P-value. For this study being exploratory in nature, we use an
α of 0.05 for this step. This gives us 0.05/4 = 0.0125 as our αc. By this standard, the
Modification predictor variable would be removed from the model because it is above the
αc threshold by 0.0125.
As mentioned in Chapter III, the only way an independent variable can remain in
the model is if it fails the αc threshold by only a small margin, and in each case an
analysis will be conducted on the importance of keeping said independent variable in the
model. In this case, Modification is above the αc by a relatively small enough margin that
we see value in investigating its potential to remain in the model. At first, we notice the
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Modification predictor variable has a negative value as the coefficient. Because our
Modification predictor variable is binary, this tells us that when a defense program is
characterized as modification that we can expect it to truncate the schedule duration
output.
Outside of what the data suggests, this seems reasonable to us because a
modification to a weapons system that has already been developed and operational could
indeed have a higher probability of a quicker duration to IOC, as compared with a new
program that is being developed and tested for the first time. Based on our investigation,
we decide to keep the Modification in the model for the reasonableness of its predictive
nature. Also, because the Bonferroni Correction is defined as an additional conservative
measure, we acknowledge the conservatism associated with it, but choose not to apply it
in this case (Bonferroni, 2015).
At this point, because the Bonferroni Correction was not applied, we consider this
our preliminary model. Working with this preliminary model, we now apply the
previously described data analysis techniques as a means to seek validation of our
assumptions in the model.
Validating Model Assumptions
The multiple regression model assumptions will be considered validated upon
passing all data analysis techniques that are applied to it. If at any time the multiple
regression model fails any of the data analysis techniques, proper measures will be
documented and executed, and an iterative process will take place until the deficiency is
remediated.
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Please note that if the model fails a particular data analysis technique, we will stop in
the phase in which it failed, and it will be dealt with and re-analyzed in the current phase
it is in. This purpose serves to show detailed continuity in the process, without restarting
the entire process for each failure potentially encountered.
Variance Inflation Factors
With respect to our preliminary model in Figure 8, we see that the VIF scores are
all well under the value of 2. While all VIF scores are under 2, all of the VIF scores
remaining are actually in the lower range, closer to that of a VIF score of 1. The analysis
of this tells us that there is no consequence of multicollinearity present in the preliminary
model. By this, there is no linear dependency between two or more independent variables
where the value of one predictor is dependent upon another (Stine, 1995). With all of the
preliminary model’s VIF scores passing the test, we move onto the Cook’s D test.

Figure 8: Preliminary Model VIF Scores
Cook’s Distance Test
Looking to our preliminary model in Figure 7, we now conduct the Cook’s D test
on the data of our 45 programs to test the influence of data point(s) when performing our
multiple regression analysis (Cook, 1977). As noted before, a Cook’s D value that is
greater than 0.5 indicates that an influential data point exists (Neter et al., 1996:381).
Influential data points may be removed from the data set upon investigation, justification,
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and documentation outlining the process by which the decision was made to remove the
data point. Figure 9 displays the Cook’s D for our model.

Figure 9: Display of Cook’s D Plot
Our Cook’s D plot displays all data points below the previously defined 0.5
threshold. This means the Cook’s D test conducted on the 45 programs shows no data
points that are influential on our preliminary multiple regression model. With the Cook’s
D test showing no influential data points (Figure 9), we now look for potential outliers in
the data set.
Studentized Residuals
We generate a histogram (Figure 10) of the studentized residuals to look for
potential outliers in the data. Since all studentized residuals lie between 3 and –3 on this
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graph, there appears no outliers for us to worry about. Given the relatively normal
distribution shape, we expect that when we test the assumption of normality on the nonstudentized residuals via the S-W test, that this assumption will be validated.

Figure 10: Studentized Residuals
Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) and Breusch-Pagan (B-P) Tests
As detailed earlier in Chapter III, the S-W goodness of fit test (Neter et al., 1996:
111) assesses the assumption of normality with respect to the residuals of the multiple
regression model, while the B-P assesses the assumption of constant variance.
Since both Figure 11 and Table 4 indicate P-values greater than our established
criteria of 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for either test. [Note: Figure 12
displays the sum of squares for regression (SSR) that we need for the B-P test conducted
in Excel.] Therefore, we conclude our multiple regression model passes both model
residual assumptions.
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Figure 11: Shapiro-Wilk's Test

Figure 12: ANOVA Output
Table 5: Breusch-Pagan Test Results

Validation of Assumptions
The statistical tests that were performed on our preliminary regression model
from Figure 7 were done so to try to validate our previously mentioned assumptions
about the model. Because all statistical tests were passed to validate our assumptions, we
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can consider our preliminary regression model from Figure 7 as our non-preliminary,
main model for the continuing purpose of our research.
Analysis of Predictor Variables
Our statistically significant predictor variables tell us individually something
about themselves outside of their presence in the validated model. The parameter
estimates for our model are displayed in Figure 13. We deep dive each individual
predictor variable, and discuss the estimates associated with each.

Figure 13: Parameter Estimates for Predictor Variables
The predictor variables that are statistically significant in the validated model are
listed along with an analysis of each next:


RDT&E $(M) at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable
o The parameter estimate associated with this variable is 0.00772 which
would be multiplied by the raw amount of RDT&E funding in BY16
dollars (millions) allocated to the program at MS-B start. It should be
noted that even if the overall RDT&E funding outlay of a program is
uniformly distributed for the entirety of its RDT&E expenditures, the
variable only looks at purely the raw amount of BY16 dollars at MS-B
start. Perhaps the 0.00772 estimate output for this variable is
associated with the idea that the raw amount of RDT&E dollars
(BY16) that are present in a program at the time of MS-B start is
related to “technology” or even “technology maturity”. While there is
no way to prove that within the scope of our research, the multiple of
0.0072 seems to account for anticipated complexity of a system in
predicting schedule duration from MS-B to IOC, as more raw money
for this variable is an additive factor to schedule output.



% of RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable
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o This variable is the strongest variable with respect to its Standard Beta
(weight) in Figure 13. The parameter estimate of -86.704 for the
predictor variable suggests the greater the % of RDT&E funding that
has been allocated at MS-B, the greater the decrease of schedule
duration from MS-B to IOC. The idea of this variable can be linked
back to the purpose of the technology maturation and risk reduction
(TMRR) phase, which occurs immediately prior to MS-B. According
to DoDI 5000.02 (USD(AT&L), 2015), the purpose of TMRR “is to
reduce technology, engineering, integration, and life-cycle risk” before
program initiation. Based on this definition, we theorize that
increasing the % of RDT&E funding prior to program initiation (MS-B
start) is synonymous with increasing technology maturity and reducing
risk prior to program entry at MS-B. Our finding is supported by the
Unger et al (2004) study, which finds that program RDT&E budgets
that can be fit with an increasingly right-skewed Weibull distribution
encounter less schedule growth, on average.


Modification – Binary Variable
o This variable is -19.345 which means that when the program being
analyzed by our regression model is characterized as a modification
that it should take away from the overall schedule duration output of
the model. Because our literature included many studies that alluded to
the idea that a higher probability of cost and schedule problems raise
when programs start with technologies at low readiness levels, a
modification having a shortening effect on schedule output seems
reasonable to us because a modification to a weapons system that has
already been developed and operational could indeed have a higher
probability of a quicker duration to IOC, as compared with a new
program.



1985 or Later for MS-B Start – Binary Variable
o Every program schedule created contemporarily will use a “1” for the
binary applicability of this predictor variable. The parameter estimate
of 19.586 suggests that programs after 1985 will actually add time to
the schedule duration of a program. For some, this may seem
counterintuitive in that it could be argues that technology gets better as
time goes on, and therefore program schedule should be shorter as
time goes on because of this. On the other hand, systems are becoming
much more complex as time goes on, and the technical maturity of a
weapons system that needs to meet the demands of 21st century
warfare could actually take longer with time due to the high-level of
complexity. Originally, this variable was discovered by Brown et al.
(2015) in reference to the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense (commonly called the Packard Commission) and the
subsequent acquisition reforms. In the current environment of tight
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budgets, heightened acquisition reform, and weapons systems being
more complex than ever before, it seems completely reasonable that a
program with an MS-B start after 1985 would add time to the MS-B to
IOC schedule duration.
The predictor variables that were found to be statistically significant in our regression
model all give strong contributions to the method of predicting schedule duration to IOC.
At the most basic level, our predictor variables have a strong logical link to predicting
schedule duration for a program. Furthermore, all of the predictor variables in our model
are accessible and available to the cost estimator via data that can be found in the SAR of
a program.
Performance of Multiple Regression Model
We judge the performance of our multiple regression model using the R2 and
Adjusted R2 values as shown in Figure 17. An R2 of 0.465 indicates that the model
explains almost 50 percent of the variability associated with predicting time duration
from MS-B to IOC. Brown et al. (2015) acknowledges that cost and schedule estimates
are rarely clairvoyant, particularly in the early stages of a program. Because we seek to
predict program schedule duration to IOC at the very beginning of a program’s life cycle
(program initiation), an R2 of 0.465 can actually be considered strong when taking into
account the on-going documented problems with schedule growth from our literature
review.
Our model’s Adjusted R2 is 0.412 and we can also gauge the Adjusted R2 to be
relatively strong, based on the true lack of clarity regarding a program’s schedule,
especially in the very beginning of a complex weapons system acquisition. Since
Adjusted R2 ensures we do not arbitrarily add variables to the model that are not
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predictive, the distinction should be made that we can highlight the R2 of this model to a
cost estimator or decision maker as a descriptor of the model’s robustness, but the
Adjusted R2 of this model is the value that should be focused on when making decisions.

Figure 14: Model R2 and Adjusted R2 Values
Validation of Multiple Regression Model
As a matter of testing predictive ability of our finalized model, we compare the
accuracy of our fitted multiple regression model against programs with information from
the research validation database. But prior to this, we first mention the range of our
explanatory variables for which this model can be used. This is to prevent model
extrapolation.
We present histograms of the range of values we can input for the continuous
variables, X1 and X 2 in Figures 15 and 16. In our histograms of the RDT&E $(M) at
MS-B Start (BY16) variable and % of RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) variable, we
see our ranges are between $13.581M and $5,979.4M (BY16) , and 1.09 percent and 59.2
percent, respectively.
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Figure 15: RDT&E $ (M) at MS-B Start (BY16) Quantiles

Figure 16: % RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) Quantiles
Next, we proceed to look the MAPE and MdAPE associated with our model built
from the 45 original programs. We also look at the MAPE and MdAPE of the 11
programs from the validation pool, and compare both models.
In Figure 17, we note that the MAPE is 0.379 and the MdAPE is 0.219 for our
model built from 45 programs. Of the 45 programs, we also notice 6 outliers in the
histogram. Of the outlier subset, three are electronics programs, two are missiles
programs, and one is a bomber program. What we can note about the electronics and
missiles programs is that they had a relatively low time frame to reach IOC. In the
missiles programs, one was a modification, and two of the electronics programs were
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modifications. The lone bomber program (A-10) experienced a relatively low time to
IOC, probably because the first generation of this aircraft was relatively low in
complexity.
In Figure 18, we note that the MAPE is 0.193 and the MdAPE is 0.167 for our
validation pool of 11 programs. Of the 11 programs, we also notice one outlier in the
histogram. The outlier is a modification program to a bomber aircraft (B1-B).

Figure 17: MdAPE and MAPE of Final Model

Figure 18: MdAPE and MAPE of Validation Pool
Due to the great disparity of sample sizes in each of the respective APE and
MAPE outputs, along with the lack of normality from the distribution of the outputs, we
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look to the MdAPEs as the much more representative numbers for comparing our sample
outputs. With the final model having a MdAPE of 0.219 and the validation pool model
having a MdAPE of 0.167 we can see that they are not far off from one another. This
gives us some confidence in saying the two models are comparable. However, we can
gain more confidence if we look to a comparison of actual by predicted plots of both the
final model and validation pool; this will gives a visual representation of the predictive
power of each of the models with their respective sample sizes.

Figure 19: Bivariate Plot of Model with 45 Programs
In Figure 19 we see a relatively good fitted line to our 45 data points. Please note
that while our line does intersect some of the data points, there still tend to be many
points that are away from the line, but none so egregious that it causes concern.
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Therefore, for the intended purpose of predicting schedule duration to IOC, this fitted line
seems to satisfy our intended use of the model. While confidence intervals are not applied
to this fitted line on the graph, we speculate that a decision maker would be inclined to
adjust the predicted schedule duration output based on their experience and knowledge of
a program. Next, we look to the bivariate plot of our validation pool in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Bivariate Plot of Validation Pool with 11 Programs
In Figure 20, we see our fitted line to the validation pool of 11 programs. Notice
the line is relatively close to seven of the 11 data points, while other points seem to be a
little bit further away. While confidence intervals are not applied to this fitted line on the
graph, we propose that as many as two additional data points could make it into the
predicted output range of the displayed 11 data points.
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Overall, due to comparison of the MdAPE and MAPE of both the final model and
validation pool, along with comparison of the predicted by fitted bivariate outputs, we
can consider out model valid. Therefore, finally, we compile all the data from the final
model and the validation pool to just update variable parameters, and this becomes our
complete final model, thus concluding the validation part of your analysis. When our 45
programs are combined with the 11 from the validation pool, our final model using 56
programs is displayed in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Final Model with all 56 Programs
We can see that final model in Figure 21 with all 56 programs, when compared to
the preliminary model of 45 programs in Figure 7, holds much of the same validity when
compared to one another. The R2 and Adjusted R2 are still somewhat relatively the same
with only a minor change in both, the intercept only went down by one month, all of the
independent variables remain significant when the Bonferroni Correction is not applied
as a conservative measure, and the VIF and Stand Betas also hold their same
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characteristics. This is our full and complete final multiple regression model with the data
of all 56 defense acquisitions programs.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we create a preliminary multiple regression model, validate model
assumptions, validate the model, and report the results of our finalized multiple
regression model for predicting schedule duration of a program from MS-B to IOC. We
explain some of our findings to include statistical testing applied to the regression model
built. We continue with a separate, in-depth analysis for each of the predictor variables
that were found to be statistically significant in the final model. We further solidify our
belief that our multiple regression model is robust, parsimonious, and statistically sound
through judgement of our performance measures. Lastly, in our validation of the model,
we bring all 56 programs together to create a finalized model multiple regression model
that is statistically significant. In the next chapter, we conclude our research and present
some broad discussions and meaning to our analysis.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the quantitatively-focused method in our research that is
driven by the data of past weapons systems. The major finding in our research was a
statistically significant multiple regression model, which may be used to predict schedule
duration to IOC for a program. First, we revisit our initial research questions to validate
that our research accomplished its intended goal. Additionally, we review the limitations
of findings, identify areas for future research, and conclude by summarizing the
significance of this research.
Research Questions Answered
1 – Can we accurately predict what the schedule duration of a defense
acquisition program should be, from MS-B to IOC, using a mathematical model?
With respect to the final model we created and the available data we were able to
gather, the answer is yes. Schedule duration to IOC output can be given for any program
that has available data inputs necessary to populate the model. All of the data necessary
for the continuous and binary variables can be gathered from the SAR in any given
program at MS-B, such that our model is statistically significant in predicting MS-B to
IOC schedule duration using only the data available up to MS-B start.
2 – Can we statistically show that some independent variables are stronger than
others when it comes to predicting a future program’s schedule duration?
As outlined in Chapter IV when we deep dive into the analysis of each predictor
variable and its effect on the multiple regression model, the answer to this research
question is yes. In the analysis of the predictor variables, each predictor variable’s
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parameter estimate gives us a foundation from which we can statistically infer that some
variables are stronger than others as far as predictive properties are concerned for our
model.
Our two strongest predictors of schedule duration were the 1985 or Later at MS-B
Start variable and the % RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) variable. Of the two, the
% RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) variable is the stronger predictor, as noted by
Standard Beta outputs from JMP®. In Figure 22, we display a pie chart showing the
percentage contribution for each Standard Beta as it is associated with its independent
variable.

Figure 22: Pie Chart of Standard Betas
Another predictor variable that showed strength in predictive ability was a post-1985
MS-B start date. This perhaps accounted for the increasing complexity of weapons
systems over time, along with effects of the Packard Commission, and serves as an
additive factor to the model. Modification programs were seen as to have a postulated
schedule efficiency associated with them, considering the binary variable took away from
the schedule ration output. Finally, we note that is statistically significance in the sheer
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amount of money a program has at MS-B start. It produces a slight additive factor, as to
account for cost growth seen in programs that heavier amounts of funding by way of their
complexity.
Findings
The biggest finding was the % RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) variable.
This is significant because it directly relates to previous studies from Brown et al. (2015)
and Unger (2001), which found a correlation between front loading RDT&E funding and
minimized schedule growth. Our % RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) variable
sought to identify the percentage of a front-loaded RDT&E funding profile at MS-B for a
program if it existed. For the purpose of our model, those programs that apply a more
front-loaded RDT&E funding profile at MS-B, they should see a lessened schedule
duration to IOC, as the statistics suggests.
Furthermore, there were no significant findings in the planned concurrency of a
schedule. Planned concurrency did not show to be statistically significant in a positive or
negative impact to the model. Along with this, the planned quantity of a program’s units,
specific contractor, and a program that planned prototypes all were not shown to be
statistically significant in predicting schedule duration to IOC. Finally, the model was
shown to be service-agnostic, meaning there was no distinguishable schedule
characteristics in which service the program was for, according to our model.
Limitations
We recognize several major limitations of this research, and that could potentially
limit the application of it in the greater cost analysis community. First and foremost, we
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must recognize that our model can only be as good as the data that was used for it. The
availability of pre-MS-B data was perhaps the strongest limitation we encountered. The
scarcity of available pre-MS-B data was a major proxy that led us to source 56 programs
for our research database from the original SAR database. Of the data that we originally
set out to gather based on our highlighted findings in the literature review, we had to
further narrow the scope of data collection because much of that data was simply not
available us in the SAR database we used.
Perhaps the most important pre-MS-B information that was not available to us in
the SAR database was the TRL of a program. Many of the studies in our literature review
tested the idea that schedule growth in a program has a strong correlation to the
technological maturity necessary for the program going into MS-B. More pre-MS-B data
available on programs would be necessary to highlight more predictor variables, and of
that necessary data that was not available, prior studies particularly suggest that the TRL
of a program could potentially have been a statistically significant predictor variable in
our model.
Our finalized model was developed using data from 56 different programs, which.
The total amount of programs used could be another limitation in our model. First, we
must acknowledge that some of the studies in our literature review used less than 56
programs in their studies, but other studies in our literature review used more than 56
programs. Comparison of studies on programs may not be completely analogous due to
the scope of program types used in a previous study, or the availability of their respective
data. However, we can postulate a sensitivity analysis on the number of programs used in
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our model, with the idea that the model could maybe have been more robust if more
programs were used that had the available and necessary data we used in our model.
Finally, we look to the potential accuracy limitations associated with the final
model output. While we did answer our first research question of creating a statistically
significant model that can accurately predict schedule duration to IOC, we do recognize
that rarely does one model fit perfectly for all of its future intended uses. Schedule
duration to IOC output can be given for any program type that has available data inputs
necessary to populate the model, but we must also address the adjustment factor for the
Modification predictor variable. In using the Modification predictor variable for a bomber
program, it can be hypothesized that our model’s schedule duration output for a
modification program may be slightly more precise in its accuracy when compared to
using the model for non-modification programs.
All of the stated limitations in the research can, in some way, be tied back to the
availability of the necessary data available to us in our model building process. Our
model shows that various types of pre-MS-B activity can be predictive characteristics in
predicting schedule duration of a program. The idea that pre-MS-B data could help
predict other aspects of a program, such as cost or production, should not completely be
ignored. Perhaps this could suggest a future push to require pre-MS-B data collection of
future programs, should that program experience any pre-MS-B activity.
Recommendations for Future Research
Recommendations for future research encourage the exploration and use of the
original SAR database, as well as our modified research database of 56 programs.
Whereas our research is the first to explore predicting schedule duration using this
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methodology, we acknowledge that follow-on research and other methodologies used to
predict schedule duration can be of great value to the great cost community; especially
when we take into account the upcoming should-schedule initiative being put into place
by Secretary James. We highly encourage further exploration into program schedule
research, as it can directly or indirectly support the new should-schedule initiative. For
instance:


Collect more SAR data to further populate our research database with more
pre-MS-B data from programs, and then perform the same methodology we
used to build a multiple regression model that predicts schedule duration from
MS-B to IOC. Perhaps more predictor variables could be identified in the
model, along with new R2 and Adjusted R2 values.



Employing the SAR database to create numerous multiple regression models
that do not explicitly rely on pre-MS-B data. The numerous models would be
used to tell us predicted times for various other points in a program’s
schedule, i.e. time from MS-C to IOC, time from PDR to CDR, etc.



Perform sensitivity analyses on our model by varying each of the independent
variable inputs.



Add a competition variable to our database and determine if this variable adds
to the predictability of our model.



On a live defense acquisition program, use linear and non-linear programming
to optimize the timeliness of a program’s schedule with respect to the
program’s already predicted schedule. The linear and non-linear programming
model(s) could serve as the actual should-schedule value(s) for the program.

Chapter Summary
Accurately predicting the most realistic schedule for a program, especially at the
official initiation of a program, is an extremely difficult task considering the inherent risk
and uncertainties that are present in the early stages of a program. Programs that decide to
use an unnecessarily lengthy schedule as a program strategy run the risk of delaying the
level of technological advancement that may be critical to national safety. However,
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accelerated program schedules increase the risks of unscheduled delays and expensive
rework and retooling costs, especially if a problem is found later in the accelerated
program schedule (Drezner and Smith, 1990: iii). Our research creates a mitigation tool
against both elongated and aggressive schedule durations by quantitatively predicting a
schedule duration outcome based on historical program data.
The most noted difference between our research and previous research on
schedule is our use of a multiple regression analysis to predict the schedule duration of a
defense acquisition program. We recommend the use of a multiple regression model as a
top-level management tool to aid in identifying the duration of a program schedule at
program initiation. We believe the previously untapped resource of using a multiple
regression analysis to predict schedule duration provides a valuable tool, and merits a
great deal of utility, to both cost estimators and decision makers alike.
In addition to providing predicted schedule duration as an output, our model could
add value by serving as a cross-check to a program that already has created a schedule
estimate to IOC. Furthermore, our model also provides the cost estimator with a schedule
benchmark that they can use to try to employ operational efficiencies in a program as to
try to deliver a program’s capability quicker than what the historical data suggests;
application in this form directly supports Secretary James’ should-schedule strategy.
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms
ACAT – Acquisition Category
AFCAA – Air Force Cost Analysis Agency
AFIT – Air Force Institute of Technology
AFRL – Air Force Research Laboratory
ANOVA – Analysis of Variance
APE – Absolute Percent Error
B-P – Breusch-Pagan Test
BY – Base Year
CDR – Critical Design Review
CER – Cost Estimating Relationship
CPR – Cost Performance Report
DAU – Defense Acquisition University
DoD – Department of Defense
EMD – Engineering and Manufacturing Development
FSD – Full Scale Development
FUE – First Unit Equipped
GAO – Government Accountability Office
IDA – Institute for Defense Analyses
IOC – Initial Operating Capability
IOT&E – Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
LRIP – Low Rate Initial Production
MAPE – Mean Absolute Percent Error
MdAPE – Median Absolute Percent Error
MS – Milestone
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&D – Production and Deployment
PCA – Production Contract Award
PDR – Preliminary Design Review
RAND – Research and Development Corporation
RDT&E – Research Development Test & Evaluation
SAR – Selected Acquisition Report
SECAF – Secretary of the Air Force
S-W – Shapiro-Wilk’s Test
SECM – Systems Engineering Concept Tool and Method
SME – Subject Matter Expert
TMRR – Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction
TRL – Technology Readiness Level
VIF – Variance Inflation Factor
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Appendix B: Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management
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Appendix C: List of 56 Programs in Research Database
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

A-10 (SAR date at MS-B, March 1973) (BY70)
AWACS (SAR date at MS-B, July 1970) (BY70)
C-17 (SAR date at MS-B, Dec 1985) (BY81)
F-22 (SAR date at MS-B, Aug 1991) (BY85)
AH-64 (SAR date at MS-B, Dec 1976) (BY72)
B-1B CMUP-Computer (SAR date at MS-B, May 1996) (BY95)
C-5 RERP (SAR date at MS-B, Dec 2001) (BY00)
F-15 (SAR date at MS-B, Jan 1970) (BY70)
B-1B JDAM (SAR date at MS-B, Mar 1995) (BY95)
KC-135R (SAR date at MS-B, Jan 1980) (BY81)
B-1B Defense System Upgrade (SAR date at MS-B, Jun 1997) (BY96)
FA-18 A/B (SAR date at MS-B, Jan 1976) (BY75)
AV-8B Harrier (SAR date at MS-B, Aug 1980) (BY79)
S-3A (SAR date at MS-B, Aug 1969) (BY68)
P-8 Poseidon (SAR date at MS-B, June 2004) (BY04)
V-22 Osprey (SAR date at MS-B, May 1986) (BY84)
E-2C Hawkeye (SAR date at MS-B, May 1969) (BY68)
F-35 JSF (SAR date at MS-B, Oct 2001) (BY94)
CH-47D Chinook (SAR date at MS-B, June 1976) (BY75)
E-8A JSTARS (SAR date at MS-B, Sept 1985) (BY83)
AGM-65A Missile (SAR date at MS-B, July 1968) (BY68)
ALCM Missile (SAR date at MS-B, Oct 1977) (BY77)
AMRAAM Missile (SAR date at MS-B, Dec 1981) (BY78)
CSRL (SAR date at MS-B, June 1983) (BY82)
JASSM Missile (SAR at MS-B, Nov 1998) (BY95)
JDAM (SAR at MS-B, Oct 1995) (BY93)
JPATS T-6A (SAR at MS-B, Feb 1996) (BY95)
MARK XV Identification FoF (SAR at MS-B, Feb 1989) (BY82)
Microwave Landing System [MLS] (SAR at MS-B, Aug 1988) (BY82)
OTH-B (SAR at MS-B, June 1982) (BY82)
LGM-118 Peacekeeper (SAR at MS-B, Sept 1979) (BY82)
GBU-39 SDB-I (SAR at MS-B, Oct 2003) (BY01)
MGM-134 SICBM (SAR at MS-B, Dec 1986) (BY84)
SRAM-II Missile (SAR at MS-B, Aug 1987) (BY83)
National Aerospace System (SAR at MS-B, July 1995) (BY90)
ADS (SAR at MS-B, Sep 2004) (BY05)
AGM-88 HARM (SAR at MS-B, Aug 1978) (BY78)
AIM-9X Block 1 (SAT at MS-B, Dec 1996) (BY92)
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39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

AN/BSY-1 (SAR at MS-B, Dec 1983) (BY84)
ASDS (SAR at MS-B, Sep 1994) (BY03)
COBRA Judy Replacement (SAR at MS-B, Dec 2003) (BY03)
Harpoon Missile (SAR at MS-B, June 1971) (BY70)
JSOW-BL (SAR at MS-B, June 1992) (BY90)
NATBMD (SAR at MS-B, Sep 1997) (BY94)
NMT (SAR at MS-B, May 2007) (BY02)
SH-60B (SAR at MS-B, Jan 1978) (BY76)
UGM-96A Trident I Missile (SAR at MS-B, Aug 1974) (BY74)
SSN 774 (Virginia Class Sub) (SAR at MS-B, Jan 1996) (BY94)
T-45TS (SAR at MS-B, Oct 1984)(BY1984)
YAL-1 (SAR at MS-B, March, 1996) (BY97)
UGM-109 Tomahawk (SAR at MS-B, Jan 1977) (BY77)
SSBN 726 Sub (SAR at MS-B, July 1974) (BY74)
AGM-114A Hellfire Missile (SAR at MS-B, Oct 1976) (BY75)
OH-58D Helicopter (SAR at MS-B, Sep 1981) (BY82)
AAWS-M Javelin (SAR at MS-B, June 1989) (BY90)
SSN 21 Sub (SAR at MS-B, Jan 1989) (BY85)
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Appendix D: Contractors in Research Database
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9
C10
C11
C12
C13
C14
C15
C16
C17
C18
C19
C20
C21

Fairchild
Rockwell
McDonnel Douglas
General Dynamics
Lockheed Martin
Lockheed and Boeing
Beech Aircraft Corp
Boeing
Boeing and Bell
Northrop Grumman
Hughes
Hughes and Raytheon
Allied Corp
Textron
General Electric
Texas Instruments
IBM and GE
Raytheon
IBM Federal Systems
Bell-Textron
Newport
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Appendix E: Data for 56 Programs in Research Database
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Appendix F: Response and Predictor Variables
Response Variable:


MS-B to IOC (Months) [Regression Output]

Predictor Variables:


MS-A to MS-B Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable



Quantity Expected at MS-B – Continuous Variable



RDT&E $ (M) at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable



% of RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start (BY16) – Continuous Variable



Modification – Binary Variable



Prototype – Binary Variable



Concurrency Planned – Binary Variable



1985 or Later for MS-B Start – Binary Variable



MS-B Start Year – Continuous Variable



Air Force – Binary Variable



Navy – Binary Variable



Army – Binary Variable



Marine Corps – Binary Variable



Aircraft – Binary Variable



Fighter Program – Binary Variable



Bomber Program – Binary Variable



Helo Program – Binary Variable



Cargo Plane Program – Binary Variable
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Tanker Program – Binary Variable



Electronic Warfare Program – Binary Variable



Trainer Plane Program – Binary Variable



Missile Program – Binary Variable



Electronic System Program – Binary Variable



Submarine Program – Binary Variable



Contractor (Name of Defense Contractor(s)) – Binary Variable



ACAT I – Binary Variable
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Appendix G: Validation Pool of 11 Programs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

AWACS (SAR date at MS-B, July 1970) (BY70)
B-1B CMUP-Computer (SAR date at MS-B, May 1996) (BY95)
C-5 RERP (SAR date at MS-B, Dec 2001) (BY00)
V-22 Osprey (SAR date at MS-B, May 1986) (BY84)
CH-47D Chinook (SAR date at MS-B, June 1976) (BY75)
ALCM Missile (SAR date at MS-B, Oct 1977) (BY77)
OTH-B (SAR at MS-B, June 1982) (BY82)
Harpoon Missile (SAR at MS-B, June 1971) (BY70)
T-45TS (SAR at MS-B, Oct 1984)(BY1984)
YAL-1 (SAR at MS-B, March, 1996) (BY97)
SSN 21 Sub (SAR at MS-B, Jan 1989) (BY85)
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Appendix H: Preliminary/Main Model with 45 Programs
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Appendix I: Validated/Final Model with 56 Programs
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